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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
ADA WILILIAMS and
R. LeROY WILLIAMS,
Plaintiffs ~and Appellants,
vs.
JOYCE J. IJL'OYD,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case No.
1019'2

S'TATE'MENT OF KlN D OF CAISE
This is an action for personal injuries, property
damage and loss of consortium arising out of an
automobile accident between vehicles driven by
plaintiff Ada Williams, and defendant Joyce J.
Lloyd. At trial, damages were the only issue for
the jury.
1

DISPOSTTION IN THE LOWER COURT
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff, Ada Williams, in the sum of $1000.00
special damages and $'500.00 general dlamages; and
$100.00 property damage and $50.00 loss of use of
the au·tomobile fjf R. LeRoy Williams.
The trial Court denied ·a motion by plaintiffs
for an additur, or in the altern·ative, for 'a nev1 trial.
1
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON AP'P·EAL
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the judgment on
the verdict of the jury and a new trial.

STATEMENIT OF FAiCT'S
There is no dispute concerning the occurrence
of the automobile accident which is ~the basis of this
action. There is substantial dispute concerning the
facts :a;s to what injury was sustained by Mrs.
"'V\lilliams ·and as to what medical treatment and expense was necesslitated by the injury received in the
accident, Plaintiffs and Appellants in their sta;tement of facts h1ave stated only the facts most favorable to their position, and have not stated the facts
in the light most favorable to the jury verdict.

The nature of this appeal, Appellants contention thwt th.e jury verdict i·s again~st the weight of
the evidence, requires som·e detail las to facts and
evidence in the argument, and in argument on Point
III, Respond~nt will detail the conflict in the eviden!ce and the factual evidence that support the
verdict of the jury.
This action was brought plaintiff Ada Williams to recover damages, 1a.nd in the complaint,
never amended, she alleges th·at the injury suffered
( R. 3) :

To the plaintiff, Mrs. Ada Williams, a musculoskeletal sprain superimposed on a preesiting cervical and lum'bo s·acral osteoarth.ri~tis.

2
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Plaintiff R. LeRoy Williams asked damages for
the damage to his vehicle, loss of consortium and loss
of use of his vehicle. At time of tri;a;} the damage
to the vehicle was limited to $100.00 by Plaintiff's
Requested Instruction No. 6. ( R. ·3 7)
·The jury returned a verdict in f'avor of Mrs.
Williams for $1,000.00 special damages ·and $500.00
general dam·ages and in favor of Mr. Williams for
$100.00 property dam1age and $50.00 loss of use,
and for no loss of ·consortium.
ARGUMENT
I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NO·T c·OM'MIT PREJUDI,CIAL ERROR IN THE C·OURSE OF INS'TR'UCTING THE JURY AND NO CLAIM ·O'F ERR,OR WAS
MADE BY ~PPE LLANTS AT TRIAL.
p·o~INT

1

Appellants set forth claimed facts as to exceptions to the jury instructions being taken in the
presence of the jury. The proceedings of which Appellants complain did not occur as set for1th in their
brief. The record on appeal contains an Order by
the trial judge, Supplementing the Record on Appeal, :as provided by Rule 7'5 (h) of the Utah Rules
of ·Civil Procedure, and this Order is found at page
22·2 of the Record on Appeal, as follows:
"Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 75 (h) the Court finds that at the conclusion of the giving of all instru'ctions Mr.
Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., from counsel table,
addressed the Court and the Court's attention
was called to the fact that the preponderance
3
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of evidence instruction and burden of proof
instruction had not been given. There was no
discussion by Mr. Baldwin from counsel table
to the C~ourt a:s _to the wording of his request
for the Instructions, bU!t merely called the a~t
tention of the ,Court to the ~absence of the two
instructions. Mr. B'aldwin and Mr. Dee then
came to the bench and confidentially, 'as far
as can be done where such discussions take
place, the Cou~t and counsel discus'Sed the
merits of the request and the general tenor
of vvhat was wanted. That after discussion
at the bench, Instruction No.1 ('a) was given
to the jury."
Appellants' counsel m1ade no objection or took
any exception to the proceedings and no claim is
made that he made objection or took exception.
'The fact th'at the court's atten,tion was called
to the omlission of two instructions was not prejudicial error. There was no comment or discussion within the hearing of the jury. All th1at was ·done, rthe
court's attention was called to the fact th'at the
instruction's on burden of proof and preponderance
of the evidence had been omitted. Discussion was
a;t the bench, out of the hearing of the jury.
Appellants cite several cases to the effect that
the court should allow counsel to take exceptions out
df the ·presence of the jury. ·The cases cited are not
in point. Appellants have quoted no law, ca·se, or
text that calling the court's attention to the exclusion of basic, sitock instructions, in the hearing of
the jury, with no commen1t or discussion concerning the s'ame, would be prejudicial! error.
1

4
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The cases cited by Appellants are cases that
arose because of the trial court's refusal to allow
trial counsel to take the exceptions out of the hearing of the jury.
The case of Dowr~ie v. Powers, 193 F2nd 760,
cited by Appellant, states thlat the re'ason for the rule
providing t:hlat objections to instructions be made
out of hearing of the jury was to afford counsel
full opportun'ity to state frankly and fully his objections, without influencing or confusing the jury
on m'atters a;bout wh'ich it had no concern.
In our case there was no argument or dis-cussion before the jury. The only statement m~ade was
that the preponde~ance of evidence and burden of
proof instructions ·had not been given. If there were
any claimed prejudice, it would appear that appellant must show prejudice by wha;t was said in
the presence of the jury, not by the mere fact th~at
the court was advised briefly, without 1argument or
discussion, that the instructions as to burden of
proof and preponderance of the evidence had been
omitted.
In the case of Nolan v. B·ailey, 254 F2nd 638,
cited by Appellant, the court asked counsel, withi11
hearing of the jury, whether he h·ad any objection
to the in'Structions and counsel stJa;ted he h·ad no
objections. On Appe'al, the Appellate Court held
that there was no error by the trial court in asking
counsel, in open court, and in the he-aring of the
jury, if he had any objections. The court further
5
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stated that the reason for the rule is to give counsel
the right to make objections fully and completely
out of hearing of the jury and that the rule is for
the benefit of counsel.

Swift v. Southern

R,ailw~ay

Co., 307 F2nd 315

held it was not reversible error to require counsel
to take exceptions to instructions in the hearing
of the jttry.
No claim is made by appellant th'at any objection or exception was taken to the alleged prejudicial proceeding, or at 'any time until the filing of
a motion for new trial. The failure to object or take
excep tion to the proceedings claim·ed to be irregular
precltldes the review of such claimed irregular proceeding by the Appellate Court. In the case of State
v. Zimmerman, 78 U. 126, 1 P2d 962, on a motion
for new trial, the defendant assigned as error a
statement by the trial court to the jury, after it
appeared that the jury was having difficulty in
reaching a verdict, to the effect that the evidence
was clear and simple. The jury retired and then
returned shortly with a guilty verdict. The following language is take from the opinion :
1

"No claim is made by appellant that any objection or exception was taken to the statement made by the trial court to the jury at
the time such statement was made or at all
until the filing of the motion for a new trial.
Appellant contends th·at the statement c~m
plained of was in the nature of an ~nst~c~Ion
to the jur~ and should have been In writing.
6

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

It is well established in this jurisdiction that
an exception to an instruction must be m a,de
before verdict, otherwise it may not be reviewed on appeal. The statemen~t complained
of, however, cannot well be said to be an instruction, but whether it be regarded as an
instruction or as a remark, the rule is the
sa,me. A11 objectionable remark directed ·to the
jury must be excepted to or it may not be reviewed on appe·al, 17 C.J. 79. A remark of a
judge to a jury may not be said to be an order,
decision, or ruling and therefore it is not
demed excepted to under the provisions of
section 6806, Co1npiled Laws of Utah, 1917.
We are thus precluded from reviewing the
instruction or remark which appellant seeks
to h1a~e reviewed, because, so far as appears,
no exception was taken thereto until after
verdict.''
T'his court has held in many cases tha:t the court
will not review alleged error when no objection or
exception was taken at the tim.e of trial. Meier v.
Christensen, 15 Utah 2nd 182, 389 P2nd 734; Hanson v. Gener.al Builders Supply Company, 15 Utah
2nd 143, 389 P2nd 61; Porcupine Reservoir Co. vs.
Lloyd W. Keeler Corpor~ation, 15 Utah 2nd 318,
392 P2 620.
1

In Huber v. Newman, 106 Utah 363, 145 P·2nd
780, this Court said:
"It is elementary that when a party does not
raise objectio11s belov1 when he h1a.d notice and
opportunity to object, he may not be heard to
complain for the first tlme on appeal. We hold,
therefore, that defendant waived all of these
7
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defects if any there were, by failing to object
below and we shall not further consider them."
l-Iill v. Cloward, 3'77 P2nd 186, 14 U'tah 2nd 55,
a recent Utah case, sets forth the rule that claimed
error or cla;imed prejudicial occurrence is not
grounds for reversal if objection is not m'ade and
that the f'ailure to object waives any rights which
m1ay have existed to object. The court held:
"But there is an insuperable difficulty with
the plaintiff's position. His counsel let the
ineident pass without objection and without
a request to rectify any harm he thought had
been done. Fair play and good conscience require that he do so at the earliest opportunity.
It would be m1a,nifestly unjust to permit a
party to sit silently by, believing that prejudicial error had been committed, proceed with
the trial to its completion, and allow the jury
to deliberate and reach a verdict, to see if he
wins, then if he loses, come forward with a
claim th·at such error rendered the verdict
1a nullity. If this could be done, proceedings
after such an occurrence would be 'in vain and
thus an imposition upon the court, the jury
and ·all concerned. The court will not countenance any such mockery of its proceedings.
If something· occurs which the party thinks
is wrong and so prejudicial to him that ~e
thereafter cannot h1ave a fair trial, he must
make his objection promptly and seek redress
by moving for a mistrial, or by having cautionary instructions given, if that is deemed
adequate, or be held to waive whatever rights
may h:a.ve existed to do so."
8
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POINT II
CO'UNSEL FOR DEFENDANT DID NOT C·OMMIT
PREJUDICIAL ERR'OR, AND CLAIMED ERROR OF
COUNSE'L IS NOT A GROUND O·F APiPEAL.

Claimed error of counsel is not a grounds for
appeal or reversal of a Judgment.
Appellants have raised two points on appeal
that are one point. 'The argument m'a~de in relation
to Point I of Appellants' Appeal is Respondent's
complete answer to the claimed Point II.
POINT III
THE C·O'UR·T DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.

This Court has ruled uniformly and repeatedly
that the trial court has a broad discretion in ruling
on a motion for new tri1al and that the ruling should
not be disturbed unless there is a plain abuse thereof.
The rule is well set forth in the case of Wellman v.
Noble, 12 Utah 2nd 350, 366 P.2d 701:
"'The trial Court has a broad dis-cretion in
ruling on such a motion (i.e. 'A motion for
a new trial) which we should not disturb
unless it is a plain abuse thereof. We apply
a different rule in determining whether this
Court on appeal should grant a new trial and
whether the trial Court abused its discretion
in granting a new trial. The appellate Court
should overrule the tri,al Court's denial of a
new trial involving a jury verdict only when
upon a survey of all the evidence and the
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefron1
and when viewed in the light most favorable
9
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to the jury verdict, the amount of the award
cannot be justified by the evidence on any
reasonable basis.''
Appellants cite the case of Jensen v. Howell,
75 Utah 64, 282 P. 1034, however the holding of the
court in that case clearly supports the proposition
that in law cases, the findings of the trial court
must be upheld when there is sufficient competent
evidence to support the findings.
Appellanits further misconstrue the 1applicable
law in interpretation of the case of Toomer's Estate
v. Union Pacific R~ailroad Company, 121 Utah 37,
239 P2d 163. That case involves the question of upholding ·a jury verdict and states the genel4al rule
that the evidence and every inference and intendment fairly arising therefrom is to be viewed in
the light MOST FAVORABLE TO THE VERDICT
OF THE JURY. (E1nphasis ours)
This court has held repeatedly that, on appeal,
the court must view the evidence in the light most
favo~able to the decision of the jury. Anderson v.
Nixon, 104 U '262, 139 P'2nd 216; I vie v. Richardson,
9 Utah 2nd 5, 33H P!2 '781; Ferguson v. Jongsrna,
10 Utah 2nd 179, 350 P2nd 404; Taylor v. Johnson,
15 u·2nd 34'2, 393 P2nd 382.
This court recently held in Gordon v. Provo
City, 391 P'2nd 4·30, 15 Utah 2d 287, that there must
be substantial and prejudicial error to reverse a
judgment; that there is a presumption of Vialidity
of the jury verdict; and that the evidence and all
10

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom are to be viewed in the light most favorable
to the jury findings.
In this case there was a subs:tantial conflict
in the evidence as to the injuries suffered in the
accident and as to whether or not the medical tre~at
merrt and operation were a direct and proximate
result of th·e accident.
T·h.is court has held th!a;t the jury has the prerogative of judging the credibility of the witnesses
and the weight of the evidence. In Arnold Machinery
Company v. Intrusion Prepakt, Inc., 357 P.2·d 496,
11 Utah 2nd 246, it was held that a jury was not
obliged to allow the full amount of repair costs to
plaintiff's property, although there was no evidence
otherwise, and a witness can be disbelieved entirely
because of self-interest; can be disbelieved in part;
or 'lris testimony discounted to any reasonable extent.
The jury is not required to believe any of the
testimony of plaintiffs or their witnesses and as
the fact finder, the jury is not required to believe
the uncontradicted evidence of a witness. Gagos v.
Industrial Commission of Utah, et al, 48 P2nd 449,
'87 Utah 101; llfiller v. Colurabi~a Trust Compiany,
225 Pac. 609, 63 Utah 305.
In the case of Holland v. Brown, 15 Utah 2nd
422, 394 P2d 77, this court upheld 'a jury verdict
where $1.00 damages were given by the jury, although the uncontradicted evidence in the case
11
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showed substantially greater damages. In holding
that the self interest of a witn·ess m·ay be sufficient
basis for rejecting his testimony and th'at the jury
m1ay judge testimony in the light of their experience
in everyday affairs of life, the court said:
"Short of capriciously or arb'itrarily rejecting credible evidence when there is no sound
reason to do so, it is the exclusive province of
the jury to determ'ine credibility of witnesses.''
By ·Statute in Utah the jury is the exclusive
judge of the credibility of the witnesses; the statute, U.C.A., 78-·24-1, states:
"Who May Be Witnesses - Jury to Judge
Credibility. Alii persons, without exception,
otherwise than as specified 'in this chapter,
who, h1aving organs of sense, can perceive, and
perceiving, can m'ake known their perceptions
to others, may be witnesses. Neither parties
nor other persons who have an interest in the
event of ·an action or preceeding are excluded;
nor those who have been convicted of crime;
nor persons on account of their opinions on
matters of religious belief; although, in every
case the credibility of the witness may be
drawn in question, by the evidence :affect~ng
his character for truth, honesty or 1ntegrrt):',
or by his moti~es, or by contradi~tory evidence; and the JUry are the exclusive JUdges
of his credibility."
The jury was not bound to believe the evidence
presented by plaintiffs and were not bound to believe the plaintiffs.
This was a case of conflicting and disputed
12
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evidence from plaintiffs' own witnesses as to the
injuries resulting from the ,accident. There was no
question that plaintiff Ada Willi!ams was suffering
from a pre-existing ·back and neck condition ·and
the complaint, never amended, alleged her injury
to be, ( R. 3) :
'''a musculo skeletal sprain superim·posed on
a pre-existing cervical an·d lumbrosacral
arthritis.''
Plaintiffs' medical evidence clearly indicated
that Ada Williams had degenerative disease of the
discs of the back, pre-existing th'is accident. T'he
operative procedure was to correct the pre-existing
degener1ative condition, cervical disc disease, and
which disease was not proximately caused by the
accident.
Mrs. Williams was not aware of any injury
until after she arrived home ·after th·e accident
(R. 75) and made no compl aint of injury at the
scene (R. 94, 160). After arriving home lVIrs. Williams had a headache and her neck hurt and she
went to see Dr. Hargreaves (R. 76). She used hot
packs on her back and neck ( R. 77) and used trla,ction at home (R. 78). She saw the doctor once a
week, then later it was every other week, and he
·prescribed some medicines for pain. She was not
confined to bed except when using tracticn. (R. 79).
1

In October of 1963 she saw Dr. Norman Beck
and l1ater in November had a neck operation at the
13
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Holy Cross Hospital. (R. 84) ·The operation was by
Dr. ·Beck and Dr. Karavitis ('R. 82).
Defendant stipulated as to the reason·a:bleness
of the medical bills and expenses claimed by plaintiff with the exception of the ch1arges made by Veri
Wilde, a p·hysical therapist. Defendant did not agree
or stipulate that any of the bills were necessitated
by the accident in question ('R. 3'3, 84, Exhibit 2.)
There were contradictions in the evidence of
Mrs. Williams and she was evas~ive in her testimony.
On direct examin1ation Mrs. William·s testified
she was hospitalized from November 3rd until December, the date of the last charge made to her;
She testified, (R. 81) : ·
An·d ·how long did you stay in the Holy
Cross Hospital?
A. I was in there about 4 weeks, I believe.
Three or four week·s, I don't remember.
Ag;ain she testified, ( R. 83) :
Q.

When did you enter the hospital? The
dates ,are shown here as to the date of
entry?
A. 11-3-'63
Q. And does that show the period of time
for your care from November through
December?
A. It does.
On Cross Examin·ation Mrs. Williams again
testified she was 'in the hospital for about three
Q.

14
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weeks then she admitted that she was disch1arged
from the hospital on November 14, 196·3. (R. 93.
Exhibit 5.) She was therefore in the hospital 11
days and discharged the 14th of November not in
December as she told the jury on dire:ct examin·ation.
Mrs. Williams testified that s·he had never h'ad
1any difficulty with her arms or neck prior.to January of 1963 and had never been to a doctor to receive
any treatment for her neck or prain around her
neck prior to the accident. She testified : ( R. 85)

Q.

* * * Mrs. Williams, did you h·ave any

difficulty with your neck and your arms
prior to January of 1963?
A. Never.
Q. H1ad you been to a doctor relative to any
treatment for your neck or pains around
your neck?
A. No.
She testified that after the accident she had
some numbness in her hands and she was asked
on cross examination : ( R. 94)

Q.

Hadn't you had that in 1960, this numbness in your hands?
A. No, I never.
Q. You never had numbness in your h·ands
before?
A. O·h, I had them go to sleep on me before,
yes. B·ut not the numbness.
Q. Not in arising in the morning, your
hands were never numb?
15
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A. No.
She was then asked about hospitalization in
19'60 and admitted tha;t hospitaliz;a:tion but it was
more of ·a checkup, p·ain in her right side, in her
·heart. (R. 95) lShe testified she had no complaints
of abnormal distres'S 'at that time. ( R. 9'5)
The complaints and troubles at the time of her
'hosp'italization in 1960, she admitted, were true.
(R. 95)
Exhibit ·5, received in evidence, the records of
the Holy Cross Hospital when Ada Williams had
the cervical neck fusion state:
"A·dm. Diagnosis CERVICAL DISC DI-

SEASE

''Fin·al Di'agnosis. C·ervical intervertebral disc
DEGENERATION. (Emphasis ours)
The Radiology Department sheet, page '5 of the
exhibit contains the following:
'';Clinical· Infromation Cervical disc disease.
·The Operative Notes, p'age 9 of the exhibit
state:
Pre-op Di1agnosis: :Cervical disc degenrative
syndrome, osteoarthritis
changes ,C 5-6 C 6-7
Plaintiffs introduced as Exhibit 10, a letter
from Dr. Norman R. Beck, stating:
"'The p'a;tient was referred to Doctor Kiaravitis in consultation and found that she had
16
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cervical disc degenerative disease, and we both
recommended disc extraction and interbody
fusion."
Nowhere in the hospital records or the report
of Dr. Beck, the Orthopedic specialist, is there any
mention of any low back injury ·as ·a result of the
accident, nor :any complaints of low back injury.
Dr. Harold P. Hargreaves was the doctor who
first attended Mrs. Williams. He testified generally
as to her condition and 'his findings, and on cross
exam in'ation admitted th·at he wrote a le·tter to
plaintiffs' attorney on July 7, 1963 relating his
findings ·and re~port of her condition (R. 12i5). He
admitted on cross examination that his findings as
to her complaints were subjective only, as to any
neurological complaints ( R. 129). He testified that
Mrs. Williams had a muscular skeletal sprain (R.
'1'29). Dr. Hargreaves testified that he saw her the
25th of January, the day after the accident. (R.
131) He did not see her th·e afternoon of the accident ·as testified to by Mrs. Twilliams.
1

Dr. Norm·an R. Beck, the Orthopedic specialist
testified concerning his eXJa.mination of Mrs. Williams (R. 133). He had x-rays taken by Dr. Robert
Crowder and these showed some narrowing of the
intervertebral space between the 6th and 7th cervical vertebrae. He testified that she had a condition of her neck that was other th1a.n normal, anu
on answer to a question by plaintiffs' attorney he
stated: ( R. 115)
17
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Q.
A.

And would you describe that condition?
Well, prior to, presumb·ably prior to her
accident she h·ad this 11arrowing of the
intervertebral dis·c space.
On cross examination Dr. Beck testified that
Mrs. Williams had cervical disc degenerative disease and that the degeneration caused the narrowing of the s-pace between the two vertebrae and that
th·e n1arrowing could cause pressure on the nerve
root. (R. 117) Dr. Beck testified that in addition
to the cervical disc degenerative disease causing the
symptoms, he could add cervical neuratrophia ( R.
119) an·d this is an abnormality of the cervical
nerve root caused by any num'ber of things. (R.
149) Dr. Beck testified that when he examined
Mrs. Williams, and by his office note of April 10,
1964, she had no low back pa:in. ( R. 15'2)
Neither of the two doctors called would or did
state that the narrowing of the cervical intervertebral interS'pace and the degenerative disc disease
was a proximate result of the ·accident.
Mr. Williams testified that he had sustained
dam·age in the sum of $5,800.00 because of loss of
his wife's companionship an·d services around the
house. He testified that there was ~a loss of love and
compan'ionshlip because of her medic'al treatment.
She moved out of her own bed into another, with a
board and traction for 3 to 4 months, and because
of the accident he was not in the same relationship
of love and companionship. (R. 146)
18
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Part of the medical expenses claimed in the
lawsuit in·cluded bills from Dr. Donald Bailey. (R.
96) Mrs. Williams admitted that one bill of Dr.
Bailey included a series of treatments for her stomach, an upper gastro-intestinal series and cardiagram taken 4 months after the accident, an·d were
not bills for neck or back X-rays. (R. -97, .Exhibit
2.) This bill of Dr. Bailey was for Upper Gastrointestinal Series and Cholecystrogram in th·e sum
of $60.00, dated 5-4-63.
Mrs. Williams testified that her hospital'ization in 1960 was for a heart condition ·and pain in
her left arm. She denied that she had complained
of numbness in both hands and in the right arm.
She specifically testified she ha·d pain in her left
arm and was in the hospital only for a heart condition. (R. '98). She testified that she never h!ad ·any
arthritis. ( R. 98)
Exlribit 4, received in eviden·ce, is a record of
hospitalization of Mrs. Ada L. Williams in the Holy
Cross Hospital in June( 1960. She was admitted
with a di1agnosis of Cholelithiasis (galls tones) . The
history portion of the exhiibit states:

'·'Neuro:

Numbness in hands in AM on arising."
"'HEENT: Frequent headaches past 3
years."
The records, Exhibit 4, indicate she had some
gastrointestinal com plaints.
There were many factors in the

tri~al

of thj ~;
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case that would allow the jury to discredit the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Williams. Her evasiveness
and misstatement concerning her length of hospitalization : her testimony concerning the previous hospitalization; her denial of previous symptoms of
numbness of the rarms and hands; her statement
that she saw Dr. H;argreaves the afternoon of the
accident and her attempt to claim as damages the
bills for the gall bladder examination after the accident, it being a condition for which she had previously been treated.
The jury s-aw the witnesses, knew of their
interest, observed their demeanor, heard their testimony an·d was the judge of the credibility of the
witnesses.
The medical eviden·ce in the cas-e was in conflict and the jury could well h1ave found tha,t the
operation was not necessitated by the accident, but
by the pre-existing cervical disc disease. The Orthopedic specialist called would not state that the accident was the cause of the operation !and plaintiffs
did not feel it necessary to call as ·a witness the
Neurosurgeon who treated Mrs. Williams.
·Counsel for Ap,pellants and Plaintiffs is indulging in spurious argument in attempting to read inferences in the comments of the trilal judge in refusing to grant a new trial. As ean be seen by the portion of the record quoted by Appellants, a settlement offer had been made to plain·tiffs, and the
court was aware of the offer and its refusal by
20
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Appellants. T·he fact that the verdict for Appellants
was less th·an was offered in settlement is no indieation that under the facts that came out at trial,
and the jury's finding as to those fa:cts, that the
'jury verdict must be equal to the settlement offer.
T·he court, in denying the motion for a new
trial, stated that P1·aintiffs had lost. They did lose
in that the verdict was less than the settlement
offer. Offers of settlement are m·ade to compromise,
save expense of trial, and are m·ade by the liawyers.
In this case the jury heard the facts, saw the witnesses, judged the evidence and facts and returned
a verdict from the facts they believed from the
evidence.
1

CON'CLUSION
The Plaintiffs !and Appellants had a fair trial
in all particulars. 'T·he jury heard the evidence,
found the facts from the evidence and all reasonable
inferences, and returned a verdict in conformlity
with the facts and evidence.
The trial Judge did not ~a:buse his discretion in
refusing to grant a new trial and the Judgment
upon the Jury Verdict should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON AND BALDWIN
ERNE'ST F. BALDWIN, J·R.
909 Kearns Building
Salt Lake CiJty, Utah
Attorneys for
Defendant ~and Respondent
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